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In the United Kingdom, proposals to reform official secrecy laws could have
damaging implications for journalistic expression, whistleblowing and government
transparency. Some allege that journalism could be recast as spying. However, the
situation is more complex than that. At present, there are three Acts which deal with
espionage offences. These are contained in the Official Secrets Acts 1911, 1920 and
1939, The Official Secrets Act 1989 deals with unauthorised disclosure offences, so
called ‘leaks’ of information. The Home Office consultation, which closed on 22 July
2021, draws upon recommendations from the UK’s Law Commission, a statutory
independent body tasked with law reform. It aims to modernise the laws to meet the
threats of modern times, namely increased hostile state activity and the increased
risk of unauthorised disclosures caused by advancements in technology. The Home
Office argue that the “unprecedented developments” in technology mean that a leak
could have the same impact as espionage. A document leaked and then published
online could be accessed by hostile states, and thus the effect is the same.
Whether intended or not, the Home Office are suggesting that maximum sentences
for unauthorised disclosure be increased. This is not a full-frontal attack on
journalists, but it is obvious that journalists will be directly affected by this change.
Journalistic organisations and online disclosure outlets such as Wikileaks are most
likely to be in the firing line because they are the actors most likely to publish and
disseminate the information. The proposals therefore have a direct impact on the
right to journalistic expression which is well-established in the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights. If not rectified, the Home Office proposals
could lead to a situation whereby a law which prohibits whistleblowers from going
outside of their organisation, and is thus incompatible with Article10 ECHR, could be
replaced with an even worse law, which inhibits expression, and prevents journalists
from lawfully reporting on important matters of public interest.
Background
The Official Secrets Act 1989 Act was intended to be more tightly drafted than
the s.2 Official Act 1911 it replaced: It removed the ability for persons who make
an unauthorised disclosure to claim that they were doing so in the public interest.
It therefore prevented whistleblowers from raising concerns outside of their
organisation to persons not authorised to receive the information. The availability
of authorised channels, which include the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police
and the Prime Minister (to name two) has always been questioned. From day one,
the law has arguably failed to provide access to a safe authorised whistleblowing
channel with the ability to investigate and rectify allegations of wrongdoing. There is
a clear difference between “availability”; the authorisation to make a disclosure to a
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person or organisation in law, and “feasibility”; the practicalities of reporting security
sensitive information, the existence of whistleblowing policies and procedures and
the protections (employment law, safeguards against actions in civil law breach
of confidence or prosecution by the criminal law) available to persons who make
reports.
The Official Secrets Act 1989 criminalises the disclosure of official information
without authority. Section 1 of the Act contains a ‘catch all’ strict liability offence
for members of the security and intelligence services and persons notified by the
Secretary of State (such as members of the Intelligence and Security Committee of
Parliament) who disclose security and intelligence information. In contrast, sections
concerning defence, international relations, information resulting from unauthorised
disclosures or entrusted in confidence and information entrusted in confidence
to other States or international organisations require proof of damage. Whilst the
wording of the individual sections differ, they follow along similar lines. For example,
section 2, which concerns the unauthorised disclosure of defence information, states
that:
“…a disclosure is damaging if—
(a) it damages the capability of, or of any part of, the armed forces of the Crown to
carry out their tasks or leads to loss of life or injury to members of those forces or
serious damage to the equipment or installations of those forces; or
(b) otherwise than as mentioned in paragraph (a) above, it endangers the interests
of the United Kingdom abroad, seriously obstructs the promotion or protection by the
United Kingdom of those interests or endangers the safety of British citizens abroad;
or
(c) it is of information or of a document or article which is such that its unauthorised
disclosure would be likely to have any of those effects.”
It is this proof of damage which makes prosecution under the Act impractical and
undesirable. Leaks concerning official secrets often attract media attention and
a subsequent criminal trial will fuel the already intense media scrutiny. There is a
strong reluctance to try cases because to do so requires the disclosure of evidence
which could reveal information even more damaging than the original leak. As a
consequence, there have been very few prosecutions under the 1989 Act.
The strength of the law is in its symbolism. Crown servants are required to ‘sign’ the
Official Secrets Acts, despite all persons being subject to the provisions, regardless
of whether they sign or not. The categories of information protected by the 1989
Act are broad, and the way that they are used to assess damage bears little
resemblance to the levels of security classification attached to official information.
Whilst the reality of prosecution is unlikely, the threat of prosecution remains ever
present, particularly to those without an in-depth knowledge of the law. All of this
creates a state of ambiguous uncertainty. Crown servants may be deterred from
blowing the whistle because of fears of the unknown consequences of doing so.
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While civil servants have access to internal whistleblowing mechanisms, these
differ from department to department. The Civil Service Code provides little clarity
on the circumstances of when it is permitted to go outside of the organisation. The
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA), the UK’s whistleblowing law, protects
disclosures to the media and public in certain defined circumstances, but does not
apply to members of the security and intelligence services and armed forces. So
what about other Crown servants, such as members of the Civil Service and the
Police, who are protected by PIDA? The interaction between PIDA, which is a part
of employment law, and the Official Secrets Act 1989, which is part of the criminal
law, is unclear. PIDA does not protect whistleblowers who breach the Official Secrets
Act from prosecution. Instead, per s.43B(3) PIDA, the law’s protections do not apply
when the person making the disclosure commits a criminal offence. Crown servants
who are arrested for Official Secrets Act offences must wait for proceedings to
conclude before they can bring a claim. This situation is far from satisfactory. Reform
is required to not only bring the Official Secrets Act 1989 up-to-date but to entirely
re-balance and clearly define the rights and responsibilities of Crown Servants in
handling official information. However, this must not result in a disproportionate
restriction of their Article 10 ECHR rights to freedom of speech.
The Home Office Proposals
In 2017, the Law Commission published a detailed consultation paper on the
protection of official data. The paper provided a number of provisional conclusions
and became the subject of fierce criticism from NGOs, media outlets, lawyers and
academics who were concerned that there could be severe consequences for
journalists and whistleblowers. At the time, the Law Commission were not convinced
that the Official Secrets Act 1989 was incompatible with Article 10 ECHR. Instead it
had made suggestions to increase penalties without sufficiently considering the need
for a public interest defence and other safeguards to allow for proportionate public
interest expression. In 2020, the Law Commission published a second report, which
appeared to take on board many of the criticisms of the first report, yet, concerns still
remain.
The Government supports the Law Commission’s proposal to no longer require
proof or likelihood of damage for all offences which currently contain a test for
damage, except sections 5 and 6 where the damaging disclosure tests would
remain. Instead, the sections would be reliant upon a ‘subjective fault’ test. This
would shift the emphasis to the conduct of the person disclosing the information
(for example, whether they committed the act intentionally or recklessly, although
the precise terminology is yet to be decided) rather than on whether the disclosure
actually caused harm. Whilst this could help to solve the challenge of trying official
secrecy cases in open court, it presents a danger that persons could be prosecuted
for disclosing documents which are more harmful to the reputation of those in
government than to national security.
Not surprisingly, the Law Commission noted in its second report that several
consultees raised issues with the removal of proof of damage. It sought to allay their
fears by stating that:
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“It is our view that the majority of these concerns will have been addressed by
fortifying and balancing this recommendation with the public interest disclosure
recommendations that we make later in the Report.”
The Home Office considered the Law Commission’s proposals for a public
interest defence and for the establishment of a statutory commissioner to receive
disclosures. However, the government is of the belief that the existing secrecy
offences are compatible with Article 10 ECHR and such proposals could undermine
“efforts to prevent damaging unauthorised disclosures.” Overall, the government is of
the opinion that the current whistleblowing mechanisms are adequate.
Without question, the government were heavily influenced by the findings in R v
Shayler, whereby the House of Lords found that the defendant had opportunities
to raise concerns via a number of authorised channels but failed to do so. These
authorised routes were seen to be sufficient to negate the need for a public interest
defence and the Official Secrets Act 1989 was determined to be compliant with
Article 10 ECHR as a result. The problem with this assessment is that it fails to
recognise subsequent case law from the European Court of Human Rights, and
in particular Bucur and Toma v Romania, which determined that a member of the
intelligence services could be permitted to make a disclosure to the media where
the reporting mechanisms available were ineffective. In fact, the Law Commission
recognised in its second report that there is a real possibility that Shayler would be
decided differently today. Therefore, the UK government should take the proposal of
a codified public interest defence much more seriously.
The Home Office proposals identify that they will review the current arrangements to
raise concerns in order to assess the Law Commission’s proposals for a ‘Statutory
Commissioner.’ This is a welcome development and long overdue, particularly
as the Law Commission questioned the current mechanisms’ effectiveness to
investigating wrongdoing. What is most important is that whistleblowers have the
ability to raise concerns to an independent body external to their organisation. In
Shayler for example, it was argued that the defendant could have raised a concern
to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) but the Official
Secrets Act 1989 made this route far from clear. It was not until the 2016-2017
Annual Report that the ISC noted that it was to be an approved route to receive staff
concerns (surprisingly the Committee notes that it was not previously informed of
this). However, in its 2018-2019 report it noted that the agencies had still not lifted a
bar on allowing agency staff to communicate with the ISC directly via secure email.
Any review of current arrangements should not just assess the existence of available
mechanisms. Considerable focus must be given to the viability of making reports to
them in practice and their ability and effectiveness to investigate any allegations of
wrongdoing or malpractice.
The Home Office agrees with the Law Commission’s assessment that there should
be increased maximum sentences for breaching the Official Secrets Act. It argues
that advancements in technology mean that unauthorised disclosures are capable of
causing more serious damage than previously. The Home Office proceeds to state
that:
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“Although there are differences in the mechanics of and motivations behind
espionage and unauthorised disclosure offences, there are cases where an
unauthorised disclosure may be as or more serious, in terms of intent and/or
damage.”
Whilst it is reasonable that a thorough review of the law should consider sentencing,
the Home Office appears to use the damaging impact of disclosures as a justification
for increasing sentences. In the same exercise, it is also proposing to remove the
ability of the courts to assess the damage.
The Law Commission had recommended that consideration should be given to
whether a distinction should be made in sentencing between the disclosure offences
in sections 1-4 and sections 5 and 6, the latter two applying to everyone. The
Home Office said that they did not: “consider that there is necessarily a distinction
in severity between espionage and the most serious unauthorised disclosures,
in the same way that there was in 1989.” This is most concerning, as section 5
of the Act can be used to prosecute journalists and other persons who disclose
information provided to them by a Crown servant. Whilst the Home Office could have
been clearer in its response to the Law Commission’s proposals, without further
clarification and close scrutiny, this could have a very significant chilling effect on
journalistic expression.
Conclusion
The Home Office consultation does not provide sufficient consideration to the
protection of freedom of expression and, in particular, the vital ‘watchdog’ role of
journalists to hold the Executive to account. These proposals are at an early stage
and, just as with the Law Commission’s consultations, it is highly likely that many
interested parties will be critical of the Home Office document. Reform of the United
Kingdom’s official secrecy laws are long overdue but it is vitally important that they
are compliant with article 10 ECHR.
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